As deep neural networks are deployed in safety-critical domains such as autonomous driving and medical diagnosis, stakeholders need explanations that are interpretable but also trustworthy with formal guarantees. Existing XAI methods fall short: heuristic attribution techniques (e.g., LIME, Integrated Gradients) highlight influential features but offer no mathematical guarantees about decision boundaries, while formal methods verify robustness yet remain untargeted, analyzing the nearest boundary regardless of whether it represents a critical risk. In safety-critical systems, not all misclassifications carry equal consequences; confusing a "Stop" sign for a "60 kph" sign is far more dangerous than confusing it with a "No Passing" sign. We introduce ViTaX (Verified and Targeted Explanations), a formal XAI framework that generates targeted semifactual explanations with mathematical guarantees. For a given input (class y) and a user-specified critical alternative (class t), ViTaX: (1) identifies the minimal feature subset most sensitive to the y->t transition, and (2) applies formal reachability analysis to guarantee that perturbing these features by epsilon cannot flip the classification to t. We formalize this through Targeted epsilon-Robustness, certifying whether a feature subset remains robust under perturbation toward a specific target class. ViTaX is the first method to provide formally guaranteed explanations of a model's resilience against user-identified alternatives. Evaluations on MNIST, GTSRB, EMNIST, and TaxiNet demonstrate over 30% fidelity improvement with minimal explanation cardinality.

Considering local and bounded-size neighborhoods of knowledge bases renders logical inference and learning tractable, mitigates the problem of overfitting, and facilitates weight sharing.

In CBF-based control, the desired safety properties of the system are mapped to nonnegativity of a CBF, and the control input is chosen to ensure that the CBF remains nonnegative for all time.

Learning reliably safe autonomous control is one of the core problems in trustworthy autonomy.

In recent years, machine learning has shown great promise in a variety of real-world applications.

Neural Control Barrier Functions (NCBFs) have shown significant promise in enforcing safety constraints on nonlinear autonomous systems.

V arious approaches have been proposed for the generation of curriculum goals.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study adversarial alignment, and ask to what extent these models remain aligned when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force.

Score-based diffusion models (Song et al., 2021) have recently received significant attention within the